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ABSTRACT: Wagner’s Law is the first model of public spending in the history 
of public finance. The aim of this article is to assess its empirical evidence in Italy 
for the period 1960-2008 at a disaggregated level, using a time-series approach. 
After a brief introduction, a survey of the economic literature on this issue is 
shown, before estimating the specifications of Wagner’s Law for some specific items 
of public spending (for interests, for final consumption, for labour dependent 
income, for grants on production, and for public investments). We found a 
cointegration relationship for three out of five items. Moreover, Granger causality 
tests results show evidence in favour of Wagner’s law only for spending for passive 
interests in the long-run, and for spending for dependent labour income in the 
short-run. Some notes on the policy implications of our empirical results conclude 
the paper. 
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1. – Introduction 
Wagner‟s Law is one of the first as well as the most important models for 
the determination of public expenditure. In this paper we propose an 
analysis at disaggregated level, studying the relationship between some 
individual items of expenditure to GDP. We will refer to the Italian case, 
since the early sixties until 2008. The data used were drawn from the data 
set BIP by Bank of Italy. 
A point of debate among economists is whether the public sector should 
intervene or not in the short-term fluctuations in economic activity. If 
classical economists have always opposed such a kind of public action, the 
Keynesian school of thought invoked fiscal policies to support the economy 
during recessions. In fact, the classical economists believed that market 
forces were able to quickly bring economies to a long-run equilibrium, 
through adjustments in the labor market. Instead, the Keynesians took the 
fallibility of such self-regulatory mechanisms, precisely because of rigidities 
in the labor market. To this end, the school has prescribed Keynesian 
expansionary fiscal policies in order to avoid long slumps. 
Wagner‟s Law (Wagner, 1883; 1912) suggests that during the process of 
economic development tends to expand public expenditure in national 
income. The reasons are varied: a) public functions to substitute for private 
activities, b) the development results in an expansion of expenditure on 
culture and welfare, public intervention might be necessary to manage 
natural monopolies. Therefore, the expansion of public spending can be 
seen as a product of economic development, and not vice versa (Bird 
(1971)). 
Therefore, the Keynesian approach and the Wagnerian one represent 
two alternative positions to look at the causality between government 
expenditure and aggregate income. For the first of the two approaches, the 
direction of causality running from expenditure to income, while the second 
proceeds according to the opposite direction. 
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 provides a survey of 
economic literature on this issue. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
applied empirical methodology and a brief discussion of the data used. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 presents our concluding 
remarks and, finally, Section 6 makes suggestions for future researches. 
 
2. – Wagner’s model and the economic literature 
As the Nitti (1972), Musgrave (1969), and Rostow (1971) models, also 
Wagner‟s model too may be included among the “society models”. 
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We owe to Adolf H. Wagner – a German economist of the second half 
of the 19th century (a “socialist of the chair”) – the first theory on the 
increase of public expenditure (Wagner, 1883, 1912; Chrystal and Alt, 1979; 
Jackson, 1979). This theory proposed by Wagner is a “society theory” that 
therefore makes the growth of public expenditure dependent upon the 
structural evolution of society. He examined the existence of a desirable 
limit to the size of the public sector, determining that a limit was in fact not 
possible. In his opinion, the development of spending is determined, 
essentially, by the increase of national income. An increase of this variable 
generates a more than proportional expansion of the public sector. It 
follows that what Wagner defined as “the law of increasing expansion of the 
public sector” (Wagner, 1912), arguing, in his final analysis, that the value of 
financial pressure would increase. 
At the core of Wagner‟s thesis is, predominantly, the interaction existing 
between the growth of the public sector and that of private activities. With 
the increase of economic development, exchanges intensify among 
operators and the network of relationships becomes more and more 
complicated and controversial. All this can be addressed through legislation 
and arrangement of new and heftier controls. Moreover, since the processes 
of industrialization and urbanization create external diseconomies – such as 
the congestion effect or the deterioration of the environment –, the public 
sector has been called to find a remedy to these challenges (Wagner, 1883). 
From a methodological point of view, the empirical evidence concerning 
the relationship between public income and expenditure is based on the 
assessment of the elasticity of expenditure to income. Only if such elasticity 
is superior to the unit and the coefficient sign is positive, could we then 
come to the conclusion that the link between the two variables exists and it 
is consistent with Wagner‟s hypothesis (Fossati, 1981, 1999; Diba, 1982; 
Jackson, 1980; Hadjimatheou, 1976). 
The model proposed by Wagner has had a great influence in literature 
(Wagner, 1883, 1912). Although it has been long the fulcrum of the 
theoretical elaborations on determinants on public expenditure, with the 
passing of time it has also been subjected to an empirical assessment by 
different thinkers. The results obtained are contradictory, since with the 
changing of countries and the temporal intervals considered, the data-set 
used and of the methods applied, they lead us to conclude sometimes in 
favour of the existence of Wagner‟s Law, and sometimes against it. 
Musgrave (1969) reaffirmed how the most plausible formulation of 
Wagner‟s model is in terms of a positive correlation between the share of 
public expenditure on domestic product and per capita income; in addition, 
he found that the cross-section evidence for high-income countries does 
not confirm Wagner‟s hypothesis. However, the analysis of historical series 
shows favourable evidence in at least 60% of case. 
Musgrave (1969), Hinrichs (1965) and Gandhi (1971), working 
separately, reached the conclusion that cross-section analyses that include 
both developed and under-developed countries as well as more backward 
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countries support Wagner‟s hypothesis, while samples formed only by from 
less developed countries do not support this. 
Benoit (1978) used the rank correlation coefficient by Spearman1 and 
regression analysis to show that military expenditure has a positive impact 
on economic growth, in a sample of 44 less developed countries between 
1950 and 1965. According Benoit (1978) in less developed countries only a 
small fraction of the cuts in military spending is directed towards productive 
investment. Therefore, the reduction of this type of expenditure would not 
necessarily increase economic growth. Indeed, he argued that in these 
countries, military spending increases economic growth through different 
channels, such as, for example, increasing the degree of human capital and 
research and development. 
Kelley (1976) suggested how Wagner‟s Law must be modified in order to 
incorporate the relevant effects of demographic changes. This would result 
from the complex interaction of economic and demographic changes that 
do not necessarily require an increase of the public sphere and of state 
activity. 
Lim (1983), and Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984), however, found 
empirical evidence contrary to that of Benoit (1978): in fact, defense 
spending would directly and adversely affects economic growth, as well as 
indirectly through its negative impact on the accumulation of savings. 
Rotschild (1977), and Deger and Sen (1983) reached conclusions similar 
to those of Lim and Fiani et al., highlighting the negative impact that 
military spending has on exports. While Deger and Smith (1985) arrived at 
similar conclusions by studying the negative impact of military expenditure 
on investment. 
Singh and Sahni (1984), studying the causality link between public 
expenditure and national income for India during the period 1950-1981, 
found that the effect of the growth of public expenditure on that of 
national income is relatively low if compared to its effect on the growth of 
expenditure income. The conclusions they reach are that public expenditure 
and national income are linked by a causal mechanism of feedback; but that 
the empirical evidence suggests that such a causality relationship is neither 
of a Wagnerian nor a Keynesian type. 
Biswas and Ram (1986) found no statistically significant relationship 
between the two variables (military spending and economic growth). 
The elasticity of public spending concerning aggregate income for Italy 
has been calculated by Giarda (1988) to be equal to 0,63, whereas Bella and 
Quintieri (1989) calculated it to be equal to 0,81. According to these 
scholars, it can be claimed that during the period 1960-1985 the income 
growth determined around 40% of expenditure increase in real terms (that 
is the 2,95% per year on 7,4%). In any case, both the estimates agree in 
considering that public spending does not involve superior goods. 
                                                 
1 See: GOSSET W.S. (1921), An experimental determination of the probable 
error of Dr Spearman‟s correlation coefficients, Biometrika. 
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Ram (1986a, 1986b, 1987) tests the relationship, still in terms of 
elasticity, between the share of public general expenditure, ln(G/Y), and the 
per capita GDP, ln(PCY), by breaking the analysis down into two parts 
(time-series and cross-section). The analyses on the historical series (carried 
out in 115 countries, in relation to the period 1950-1980) show, on the one 
hand, the great difference of the estimates for the different countries. 
Henrekson (1993) noted how the crux of Wagner‟s Law originates from 
regressions to levels, invoking the causality test of Granger and Newbold 
(1974) in support of theses of erroneous inferences when variables are not 
steady. Indeed, he shown how income and the share of public expenditure 
on national product, – even if correlated – are not cointegrated, 
demonstrating this through the Swedish case in an empirical verification 
on data in historical series from 1861 to 1990. In this way, they reached 
the conclusion that correlations reported by other researchers are of 
spurious nature. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find strong evidence in favour of Wagner‟s 
Law in the cross-section analysis relating to 115 countries (in the period 
1970-1988) as well as in the historical one concerning 26 countries (from 
1870 to 1988). The correlation between per capita income and dimensions 
of public spending is often found, in both kinds of econometric analyses. 
On the contrary Oxley (1994), analyzing data on Great Britain from 
1870 to 1913, found evidence in favour of Wagner‟s Law, which resists 
and satisfies the causality test of Granger. 
Koop and Poirier (1995) examine Wagner‟s hypothesis in terms of a 
long-term elasticity of the per capita government expenditure, with regard 
to per capita income, using a bivariate error-correction mechanism, 
corresponding to a co-integrated mechanism. Of 86 countries considered, 
only in one-third of them is Wagner‟s hypothesis supported by data. The 
two scholars conclude that their calculations are in clear contrast with 
“Wagner‟s Law”. 
Cotsomitis et al. (1996) test for the long-run validity of Wagner‟s 
hypothesis applied to People‟s republic of China for 1952-1992. They find 
that evidence supports this secular validity, as estimated residuals of 
cointegrating regressions are stationary. 
Ferris and West (1996) discovered that empirical evidence is 
unfavourable to Wagner‟s Law, using data referring to the post second 
world-war period. 
Ansari et al. (1997) apply both the Granger and Holmes and Hutton 
statistical procedures to test the income-expenditure hypothesis for three 
African countries (Ghana, Kenya and South Africa), from 1957 to 1990. For 
all these countries, a long-run relationship between government expenditure 
and national income cannot be established. In fact, over this period, 
government expenditure has deviated substantially and persistently from 
national income. Moreover, in the short-run, of the three African countries 
only Ghana showed evidence of government expenditure being caused by 
national income finding support for Wagner‟s hypothesis. Finally, the 
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authors find no evidence of government expenditure causing national 
income. In other words, the Keynesian proposition is not supported by the 
data. 
Clethsos and Kollias (1997) investigate empirically the traditional 
Wagner‟s hypothesis in the case of Greece using disaggregated data of 
public expenditures and employing an error correction approach. The 
empirical findings suggest that Wagner‟s Law is valid only in the case of 
military expenditures. 
Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1998), by comparing the countries of Latin 
America to those of OECD, showed that the role of the public operator is 
more extensive in the richest countries. In other words, those countries 
with a greater aggregate income tend to have wider public apparatus. 
Asseery et al. (1999) analyze the Iraq‟s experience; they suggest that there 
is some evidence for the existence of Wagner‟s Law when income and 
several forms of expenditure are denoted in nominal terms. When 
expenditure in real terms is examined, the chain of causality runs in the 
opposite direction. In the case of spending on economic services, there is 
unidirectional causality. So, the results of these Granger causality tests are to 
downplay the support for the existence of Wagner‟s Law in Iraq and to raise 
interesting questions regarding the use of real and nominal values. 
Demirbas (1999) tested Wagner‟s Law using aggregate Turkish data for 
the period 1950-1990. According to the test results, there is no cointegrating 
relationship between the variables. Including time trends into cointegration 
regressions did not change the results either. These findings show that the 
support of Wagner‟s Law found by many early researchers may be spurious. 
In a test on Turkish data it cannot find any long-run positive relationship 
between public expenditure and GNP variables. Yet, in the absence of a 
long-run relationship between variables, it still remains of interest to 
examine the short-run linkages between them. However, there is no 
evidence to support either Wagner‟s Law in any of its versions or Keynes‟ 
hypothesis. 
Thornton (1999) analyses the experience of six presently developed 
economies (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK) for 
the period beginning around the mid 19th century and ending in 1913, and 
reports results in favour of the law. 
Kolluri, Panik and Wahab (2000) analyzed G-7 countries for the period 
1960-1993. The results of the empirical estimates show the effects of 
national income on public spending in both the short and long-run (the 
series of expenditure and income are both stationary at first differences and 
cointegrated). 
Dakurah, Davies and Sampath (2001), using the concept of cointegration 
and error correction model to study the relationship between military 
spending and economic growth in 62 countries, found no causal 
relationship between the two variables in the sample analyzed. 
Albatel (2002) studies the relationship between government expenditure 
and measures of economic development and growth in Saudi Arabia. The 
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results confirm the validity of Wagner‟s hypothesis. 
Burney (2002) analyzes the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
public expenditure and the relevant socioeconomic variables in Kuwait, on 
the basis of time-series data covering the period from 1969-94. Empirical 
results show little support for the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between public expenditure and the relevant socioeconomic 
variables. 
Chow et al. (2002) using UK data for the period 1948 to 1997 included a 
third variable, money supply, which re-establishes the long-run link between 
the income and public spending variables. Multivariate causality results also 
indicate unidirectional causality from income and money supply to 
government spending in the long-run, thus providing strong support for 
Wagner‟s hypothesis. These findings suggest that omitted variables may 
mask or overstate the long-run linkages between economic development 
and public spending. 
Karagianni et al. (2002) employ the two-step Engle and Granger 
cointegration method, the Johansen maximum likelihood method and the 
Granger causality test, in order to investigate the long-run and causal 
relationship between government spending and income. For this purpose, 
they employ six alternative functional forms, using data for the EU-15 
countries over the time period 1949-1998. The results, accruing from this 
study, are ambiguous accordingly to the method applied. The major points 
that emerge from the Εngle and Granger test are that in most of the EU 
countries, no long-term relationship has been observed, except for some 
sub-cases in Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. In contrast, the Johansen 
test supports the existence of Wagner‟s Law in most EU countries, with the 
exception of France and Italy. As far as the Granger causality test is 
concerned, patterns of causality between income and government 
expenditure display dramatic differences across various countries. 
Moreover, there is limited support for the pattern of causality; Wagner‟s 
Law is completely verified only in two countries – Finland and Italy. 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) investigated the causal relationship 
between government spending and economic growth for three Middle 
Eastern countries (Egypt, Israel and Syria) in the years 1967-1998, using 
techniques of multivariate cointegration and variance decomposition. They 
found a bidirectional causality, with a negative long-run relationship 
between the two variables in the cases of Israel and Syria, and a short-term 
unidirectional causality (from growth to spending) to Egypt. Instead, testing 
the causality for a trivariate system consisting of the share of government 
civilian expenditures in GDP, military spending and economic growth 
empirical findings show how military expenditure negatively affect 
economic growth in all three countries, while the civilian government 
spending has a positive impact on economic growth in two of them (Israel 
and Egypt), but it has a negative impact on long-term growth in Syria. 
Finally, military spending is exogenous relative to both civil and spending to 
economic growth. The policy prescription which they are received, 
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therefore, is that these three countries should reduce military spending. 
Florio and Colautti (2005) analyze the experience of five economies 
(USA, UK, France, Germany and Italy) for the period 1870-1990. They 
observe that the increase in the public expenditure to national income ratio 
is faster for the period until the mid 20th century and develop a model based 
on Wagner‟s Law. 
Halicioglu (2005) tests the validity of Wagner‟s Law for Turkey, and his 
empirical results show that Wagner‟s Law does not hold in the case of the 
adopted traditional form, since neither co-integration nor causality tests 
were in line with the proposed implications of the law. Yet, he find a 
positive long-run relationship between the share of government in GDP 
and real per capita income growth, which supports the law. However, 
further analysis on the basis of the block Granger causality test reveals that 
the law does not hold for Turkey, or at least the direction of flows has been 
rejected. 
Dogan and Tang (2006) studied the direction of causality between 
aggregate income and spending for the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand in the period 1965-2005. Using the Johansen and 
Juselius‟s cointegration method in order to analyze the relationship between 
real GDP per capita and real public spending per capita, the empirical 
evidence suggests the existence of a long-run relationship between variables 
only for Indonesia. Instead, only for the Philippines they found causality 
running from expenditure to income. While, for the other four countries 
public expenditure does not play a significant role in promoting economic 
growth. 
Akitoby et al. (2006) examine the short and long-term behavior of 
government spending with respect to output in 51 developing countries 
using an error-correction model. They find evidence that is consistent with 
the existence of cyclical ratcheting and voracity in government spending in 
developing countries, resulting in a tendency for government spending to 
rise over time. So, the researchers derive three main policy conclusions: 
first, the long-term and short-term elasticity of capital spending in relation 
to GDP is relatively high; second, there may be scope for fiscal rules or 
fiscal responsibility laws in some countries that limit the discretion for pro-
cyclical fiscal policy; third, in many countries, there is a long-term 
relationship between the level of output and government spending. 
While Shelton (2007), using a cross-country panel regressed various 
measures of public expenditure on a vector of explanatory variables 
through the “random effects method”. He underlined how the richest 
countries tend to have populations with a higher average age which would 
push them to spend more in the area of social security and of other forms 
of protection and public assistance. Besides calculating the fraction of the 
population above 65 years old, it should be emphasized that countries 
with a greater national income would tend to have less plethoric and larger 
state machines – which constitutes the complete opposite to what 
Wagner‟s Law suggests. In short, it would be the health and social 
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expenditure that would “lead” the relationship between public expenditure 
and per capita income, that otherwise would not increase jointly. Another 
determinant of “Wagner‟s Law” would be the “taxation technology”, that 
is, the expansion of the public operator would be made easier by the state 
skilfulness in increasing the tax revenue, which in turn depends on the tax 
system and its simplicity and efficiency. 
Lamartina and Zaghini (2008) considered the joint development of 
public expenditure and aggregate income in 23 OECD countries, using 
panel cointegration. The empirical evidence provides findings of a structural 
positive correlation between public spending and per capita income, 
consistent with the Wagner‟s Law. The correlation is usually higher in 
countries with lower per capita income, suggesting that the period of 
catching-up is characterized by a stronger development of public activities 
than more mature economies. 
Sideris (2007) investigates the long-run tendency for government 
expenditure to grow relative to national income using Greek data from 1833 
to 1938. Cointegration analysis validates the existence of long-run 
relationship between the variables, as expressed by the six most popular 
versions of the Law. Moreover, Granger causality tests indicate causality 
running from the variables approximating income to the government 
expenditure variable. 
Using Bangladesh data from 1976 to 2007 in a bivariate as well as a 
trivariate framework incorporating population size as a third variable, 
Kalam and Aziz (2009) empirically investigates Wagner‟s Law. The 
estimated results provide evidence in favour of the law for Bangladesh, in 
both the short-run and long-run. There is a long-run cointegration relation 
among real government expenditure, real GDP and the size of population 
where government expenditure is positively tied with the real GDP (1.14), 
per capita GDP (1.51) and population size (0.21). Both the real GDP and 
GDP per capita Granger-cause total government expenditure to change. 
Population size also comes up as a significant stimulus for public spending 
to grow in both the long-run and short-run. 
Kumar et al. (2009) examine the case of New Zealand. Results provide 
consistent results concerning the impact of income on shares of 
government spending in output with income elasticities ranging from 0.56 
to 0.84. This implies that a 1 percent increase in per capita income leads to a 
0.56 to 0.84 percent increase in the share of government expenditure of 
income. These results imply that per capita income increases by more than 
the increase in the share of the government spending in income. 
Magazzino (2009a, 2009b, 2010) studies the linkages between public 
expenditure at a disaggregate level and GDP for Italy. Empirical evidence 
suggests that only for gross public investment expenditure the hypothesis 
is satisfied. Instead, Granger causality exhibits unclear results: the 
direction of causality from public spending to aggregate income is 
observed for these categories of public expenditure: final consumption, 
public wages, gross public investment, and contribution to production. 
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Finally, Murthy (1994) suggests a broad interpretation of the law to allow 
for the addition of more explanatory variables related to economic 
development and government expenditure, such as the degree of 
urbanization, budget deficits, etc. into Wagner‟s functional forms, which 
would also reduce the omitted variable bias and mis-specification in 
econometric estimations. 
 




Tab. 1 – A comparison of studies about causality and cointegration analysis between public expenditure and GDP. 
Authors Countries Study period Causality Cointegration relationship 
Abdullah, Maamor (2010) Malaysia 1970-2007 - Yes 
Afzal, Abbas (2010) Pakistan 1960-2007 No, in any direction No 
Akitoby et al. (2006) 51 developing countries 1970–2002 - Yes, for 21 countries 
Albatel (2002) Saudi Arabia 1964-1998 Y → G Yes 
Ansari et al. (1997) Ghana, Kenya and South Africa 1957-1990 Y → Gb No 
Asseery et al. (1999) Iraq 1950-1980 Y → G Yes 
Babatunde (2008) Nigeria 1970-2006 G → Y No 
Bağdigen, Cetintas (2003) Turkey 1965-2000 No, in any direction No 
Burney (2002) Kuwait 1969-1995 - Yes 
Chletsos, Kollias (1997) Greece 1958-1993 Y → G Yes 
Chow et al. (2002) UK 1948-1997 Y  G Yes 
Cotsomitis et al. (1996) China 1952-1992 - Yes 
Demirbas (1999) Turkey 1950-1990 No, in any direction Yes 
Dogan, Tang (2006) 5 South-East Asian countries 1960-2002 G → Yc Only for Indonesia 
Dritsakis, Adamopoulos 
(2003) 
Greece 1960-2001 Y  G Yes 
Ghorbani, Zarea (2009) Iran 1960-2000 Y  G No 
Halicioğlu (2003) Turkey 1960-2000 Y  G Yes 
Henrekson (1993) Sweden 1861-1990 - No 
Huang (2006) China and Taiwan 1979-2002 No, in any direction No 
Karagianni et al. (2002) EU-15 1949-1998 No, in any direction only for Greece Yes, for 13 countries 
Kumar et al. (2009) New Zealand 1960-2007 Y → G No 
Magazzino (2010) EU-27 1970-2009 No, in any direction only for 5 out of 
11 countriesd 
Yes, for 7 out of 11 countries 
Narayan et al. (2008) Chinese provinces 1952-1989 Y  Ge Yes 
Rehman et al. (2007) Pakistan 1972-2004 - Yes 
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Samudram et al. (2008) Malaysia 1970-2004 Y → G Yes 
Sideris (2007) Greece 1832-1938 Y → G Yes 
Sinha (2007) Thailand 1950-2003 No, in any direction Yes 
Tan (2003) Malaysia 1991Q1-2002Q3 Y → G Yes 
Thornton (1999) 6 EU advanced countries 1850-1913 Y → G Yes, for 4 countries 
Verma, Arora (2010) India 1950-2008 - Yes 
Ziramba (2008) Sud Africa 1960-2006 Y  G Yes 
Notes: a: 1963-1988 for Ghana, 1964-1989 for Kenya, 1957-1990 for Saudi Arabia; b: for Ghana; c: for the Philippines; d: for Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and UK; e: for the full panel. 
Sources: our elaborations. 
 




Table 1 above presents a concise overview on cointegration and causality 
between public expenditure and national income discussed in several studies 
on Wagner‟s Law. 
 
3. – Data and methodology 
Most of time series have unit root as many studies indicated, including 
Nelson and Plosser (1982), and as proved by Stock and Watson (1988) and 
Campbell and Perron (1991) among others, that most of the time series are 
non-stationary. The presence of a unit root in any time series means that the 
mean and variance are not independent of time. Conventional regression 
techniques based on non-stationary time series produce spurious regression 
and statistics may simply indicate only correlated trends rather than a true 
relationship (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Spurious regression can be 
detected in regression model by low Durbin-Watson statistics and relatively 
moderate R2. 
One of the most widely used unit root test is the ADF unit root test 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). Alternatively, Phillips (1987) and Phillips 
and Perron (1988) proposed a nonparametric method to correct a wide 
variety of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (PP). Perron (1989, 1990) 
demonstrates that if a time series exhibits stationary fluctuations around a 
trend or a level containing a structural break, then unit root tests will 
erroneously conclude that there is a unit root. PP and ADF tests have the 
same asymptotic distributions. 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (DF-GLS, 1996) proposed a modified 
Dickey-Fuller t test (known as the DF-GLS test). Essentially, the test is an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, except that the time series is transformed via 
a generalized least squares (GLS) regression before performing the test. The 
augmented Dickey–Fuller test involves fitting a regression of the form 
 
Δyt = α + βyt-1 + δt + ξ1Δyt-1 + + ξ2Δyt-2 + … + + ξkΔyt-k + εt [1] 
 
and then testing the null hypothesis H0: β=0. The DF-GLS test is 
performed analogously but on GLS-detrended data. The null hypothesis of 
the test is that yt is a random walk, possibly with drift. 
Finally, the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992)test 
differs from those unit root tests in common use (such as ADF, PP, and 
DF-GLS) by having a null hypothesis of stationarity. The test may be 
conducted under the null of either trend stationarity (the default) or level 
stationarity. Inference from this test is complementary to that derived from 
those based on the Dickey-Fuller distribution. 
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The unit root test and the order of the integration would be performed 
on both the original series and the differences of the series using the PP 
test. 
The non-stationary series with the same order of integration may be 
cointegrated if there exist some linear combination of the series that can be 
tested for stationarity. The Johansen and Juselius procedure (Johansen, 
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990) is preferable to test for cointegration for 
more than two series. 
Moreover, Johansen and Juselius procedure is considered better than 
Engle-Granger even in two time series case and has better small sample 
properties since it allows feedback effects among the variables under 
investigation where it is assumed in the Engle and Granger procedure that 
there are no feedback effects between the variables. The procedure is based 
on likelihood ratio (LR) test to determine the number of cointegration 
vectors in the regression. Johansen technique enables to test for the 
existence of non-unique Cointegration relationships. 
Three tests statistics are suggested to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors: the first is Johansen‟s “trace” statistic method, the 
second is his “maximum eigenvalue” statistic method, and the third method 
chooses r to minimize an information criterion. 
Having established the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
government expenditure and revenues, the short-run adjustments are 
estimated using the error correction model (ECM). The error correction 
model is based on the two following equations: 
 
ΔXt = α0 + α1et-1 +   
 
   αi ΔXt-i +  
 
   αj ΔYt-i + εt [2] 
ΔYt = β0 + β1ut-1 +  
 
   βi ΔYt-i +  
 
   βj ΔXt-i + ηt [3] 
 
where et-1 and ut-1 represent the error-correction terms which are the lagged 
residuals from the cointegration relations. The error correction terms will 
capture the speed of the short-run adjustments toward the long-run 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the error correction model equations (2) and (3) 
allow to test for short-run as well the long-run causality between 
government expenditure and aggregate income. 
The short-run causality is based on a standard F-test statistics to test 
jointly the significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variable in their 
first differences. The long-run causality is based on a standard t-test. 
Negative and statistically significant values of the coefficients of the error 
correction terms indicate the existence of long-run causality. 
For the purpose of this paper, all the variables analyzed have been 
expressed in a logarithmic form. The data that have been used are annual 
and cover the time period 1970-2009, for Italy. In our case, we considered 
variables such as the various chapters of public expenditure to GDP. 
Moreover, to eliminate the effect of prices on the number of variables, they 
were deflated by appropriate deflators. 
The data used in this work were taken from the Informative Public Base 
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(BIP), a database developed by the Bank of Italy, freely available on the 
web2. 
 
4. – Econometric results 
We present and discuss an analysis of the Wagner‟s Law, applied to the 
Italian case. We disaggregate the different items of expenditure, according 
to their functional nature, in order to reveal any empirical evidence in favor 
of a model à la Wagner, but where the dependent variable instead of being 
constituted by the total public expenditure is, from time in time, the single 
item of expenditure (for passive interests, final consumption, for dependent 
labour income, for grants to production and for gross capital formation), 
while the explanatory variable is represented by the Gross Domestic 
Product. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the various items of public 
spending (in real terms) from 1960 to 2008. 
 
Fig. 1 – Disaggregated public spending (Italy, 1960-2008, mld EIT). 
 
Source: our elaborations on BIP data. 
 
In Table 2 variables of the model are summed up. All series contains 
yearly data for real value of the variables. 
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Tab. 2 – List of variables. 
Variable Explanation 
RGDP Gross Domestic Product at constant factor cost, mld EIT 
RSIP Real spending for passive interests, mld EIT 
RSCF Real spending for final consumptions, mld EIT 
RSRLD Real spending for labour dependent income, mld EIT 
RSCP Real spending for grants on production, mld EIT 
RSIL Real spending for public investments, mld EIT 
Source: BIP (2009). 
 
As a preliminary analysis, some descriptive statistics are shown in the 
following Table 3. 
 
Tab. 3 – Exploratory data analysis (Italy, mld EIT, 1970-2008). 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Range 
RGDP 7.6839 8.0588 2.5876 -0.3865 1.8534 8.3663 
RSIP 0.4832 0.5015 0.3661 0.3529 1.9511 1.1401 
RSCF 1.7794 1.8062 0.2523 -0.1535 2.3099 0.9336 
RSRLD 0.8176 0.9046 0.3061 -0.4584 1.7894 0.9586 
RSCP 0.1312 0.1262 0.0603 -0.1076 1.8184 0.2072 
RSIL 0.1964 0.1926 0.0445 -0.0915 2.6270 0.1751 
Source: our calculations on BIP (2009) data. 
 
Correlation coefficients summarized in Table 4 indicate, especially, a 
strong positive correlation between real GDP and interest expenditure, as 
for expenditure for final consumption and real GDP, and expenditure for 
labour dependent income and real GDP, too. These findings indicate that 
higher values of real GDP are associated with higher values of various items 
of public expenditure. 
 
Tab. 4 – Correlation matrix (Italy). 
 RGDP RSIP RSCF RSRLD RSCP RSIL 
RGDP 1      
RSIP 0.9500 1     
RSCF 0.9605 0.2444 1    
RSRLD 0.9923 0.9574 0.9619 1   
RSCP 0.7773 0.8420 -0.8244 0.8110 1  
RSIL 0.8684 0.2080 0.8980 0.8402 -0.7212 1 
Notes: Bonferroni adjustment applied. 
Source: our calculations on BIP data. 
 
Above all, we obtained log-transformations of the time-series. As a 
preliminary analysis, Inter-Quartile Range show the absence of outliers in 
our samples. Then, we applied time-series techniques on stationarity and 
unit root processes, in order to check some stationarity properties. Table 5 
contains results of common unit root tests, for our variables. 
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Tab. 5 – Results for stationarity tests (Italy). 
Variable  Stationarity tests 
Deterministic 
component 
ADF ERS PP KPSS 
RGDP intercept, trend NS: -1.882 NS: -0.306 NS: -2.157 NS: 0.620 
ΔRGDP intercept DS: -5.679 DS: -4.972 DS: -5.679 DS: 0.108 
RSIP intercept NS: -1.947 NS: -0.637 NS: -2.105 NS: 2.040 
ΔRSIP intercept DS: -3.148 DS: -3.319 DS: -3.129 NS: 0.916 
RSCF intercept NS: -1.831 NS: -0.063 NS: -1.757 NS: 1.220 
ΔRSCF intercept DS: -4.454 NS: -1.594 DS: -4.452 DS: 0.200 
RSRLD intercept LS: -5.574 NS: 0.411 LS: -5.638 NS: 1.490 
ΔRSRLD intercept DS: -6.188 DS: -4.358 DS: -6.189 DS: 0.078 
RSCP intercept, trend NS: -0.933 NS: -0.755 NS: -0.513 NS: 0.592 
ΔRSCP intercept DS: -10.675 NS: -2.184 DS: -10.899 DS: 0.085 
RSIL intercept, trend TS: -3.719 NS: -1.692 TS: -3.732 NS: 0.146 
ΔRSIL trend DS: -6.434 DS: -2.436 DS: -6.531 DS: 0.222 
Notes: NS: Non Stationary; TS: Trend Stationary; DS: Difference Stationary. 
Source: our calculations on BIP (2009) data. 
 
The second column presents results for Augmented Dickey and Fuller 
(1979) test; the third one for Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1992) test; the 
fourth column contains results for Phillips and Perron (1988) test; at last, in 
the fifth column there are results for Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin (1992) test. Here, results indicate that all series are clearly a I(1) 
process. Yet, public spending dependent labour income could be level-
stationary, while spending for public investments could be trend-stationary. 
The lag-order selection has been chosen according to the final prediction 
error (FPE), Akaike‟s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz‟s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information 
criterion (HQIC). These statistics selected a model with two lags for RSCF, 
RSRLD and RSCP, while only one lag for RSIP and RSIL. 
Cointegration tests have been subsequently applied, in order to be able 
to find the long-run relationship between each item of public spending and 
GDP. As is shown in Table 6, Johansen and Juselius cointegration method 
suggests that there is one cointegrating relationship in three cases (RSIP, 
RSCP and RSIL). In fact, the trace statistic and the maximum-eigenvalue 
statistic reject r=0 in favour of r=1 at the 5% critical value. As in the lag-
length selection problem, choosing the number of cointegrating equations 
that minimizes either the SBIC or the HQIC provides a consistent 
estimator of the number of cointegrating equations. Yet, all these criteria 
suggest a rank=1 for our data. While, for RSCF and RSRLD we find the 
absence of cointegration (rank=0). 
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Tab. 6 – Results for cointegration tests (Italy). 
Johansen and Juselius procedure 















































Notes: 5% Critical Values in parenthesis. 
Source: our calculations on BIP (2009) data. 
 
Granger causality tests suggest a bi-directional flow, at 1% level, for 
public spending on interests and GDP, in the long-run; a unidirectional 
flow, in the direction from GDP to spending on dependent labour income 
(at 5% level), in the short-run; a unidirectional flow, but in the opposite 
direction to the previous case, for the spending for grants on production (at 
1% level), both in the short-run and in the long-run; spending for 
investments Granger-cause GDP in the long-run (at 1% level), too. While, 
for the spending for final consumptions, no form of Granger causality has 
been found (see Table 7). 
 





FPE Causality in the 
long-run 
Causality in the 
short-run 
RSIP 1 167.2909 0.0000 RGDP → RSIP 
RSIP → RGDP 
- 
RSCF 2 134.3066 0.0000 - - 
RSRLD 2 209.5180 0.0000 - RGDP → RSRLD 
RSCP 2 156.7134 0.0000 RSCP → RGDP RSCP → RGDP 
RSIL 1 93.2312 0.0000 RSIL → RGDP - 
Source: our calculations on BIP (2009) data. 
 
For all our equations, a Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation 
in the residuals of Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM) clarifies as at 
the 5% significance level we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no serial correlation in the residuals for the orders 1,…,5 tested. Checking 
the eigenvalue stability condition in a VECM, the eigenvalues of the 
companion matrix lie inside the unit circle, and the real roots are far from 1. 
As regard the Wald lag-exclusion statistics, we strongly reject the hypothesis 
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that the coefficients either on the first lag or on the second lag of the 
endogenous variables are zero in all two equations jointly. The Jarque and 
Bera normality test results present statistics for each equation and for all 
equations jointly against the null hypothesis of normality. For our models, 
results suggest normality. Finally, the analysis of ARCH effects shows the 
absence of this problem for the estimated models. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on Wagner‟s Law 
on Italy at a disaggregated level, using recent econometric techniques. 
Wagner‟s Law is empirically tested employing time-series data. So, we study 
the relationship between real GDP and five different items of real 
government spending for Italy, using annual data for 1970-2008. The time-
series properties of the data were assessed using several unit root tests 
(ADF, DF-GLS, PP, and KPSS). Empirical results indicate that all series are 
clearly a I(1) process. Yet, public spending dependent labour income could 
be level-stationary, while spending for public investments could be trend-
stationary. Cointegration analyses reveals that three out of five spending 
series (for passive interests, for grants on production, and for public 
investments) share a common trend – and a long-run relationship – with 
real aggregate income. Granger causality tests results show evidence in 
favour of Wagner‟s Law (Y→G) only for spending for passive interests in 
the long-run, and for spending for dependent labour income in the short-
run. While, the causality flow is in line with Keynesian hypothesis (G→Y) 
for spending for passive interests, for grants on production and for public 
investments in the long-run, and for grants on production in the short-run. 
On the basis of empirical results in this paper, one may tentatively conclude 
that Wagner‟s Law finds a very weak support in Italy. Our Granger causality 
tests results show that the relationship between several items of government 
spending and national income is more Keynesian than Wagnerian. 
Yet, we find no clear evidence of government spending causing national 
income. In other words, the Keynesian proposition of government 
spending as a policy instrument to encourage and lead growth in the 
economy is not completely supported by the data for Italy. Certainly, this 
result is subject to the time period examined and statistical methods used; 
nevertheless, it is particularly discouraging for those who see Government 
as a major actor to encourage economic growth, especially in countries with 
a critical framework on public finance, like Italy. 
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